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Resumen
Este artículo usa el sistema de vouchers chilenos para proveer nueva evidencia respecto de si los
colegios privados son más eficientes que los colegios públicos. Contribuye a estudios previos
chilenos al reducir el sesgo de selección e introducir efectos heterogéneos. Los resultados sugieren
que los colegios públicos no son ni uniformemente peor ni mejor que los privados. Más aun, los
colegios públicos son relativamente más efectivos para alumnos de familias de estratos  socio-
económicos más bajos. Este sistema de ventajas comparativas es consistente con la coexistencia de
colegios públicos y privados en la mayoría de la comunas Chilenas.
Abstract
This paper uses Chile’s voucher system to provide new evidence on whether private schools are
more efficient than publicly operated schools. It contributes to the world debate by analyzing a
universal voucher system. It contributes to previous Chilean studies by reducing the selection bias
and allowing heterogeneous treatment effects. The results suggest that public schools are neither
uniformly worse nor better than private schools. Rather, public schools are relatively more effective
for students from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Such a system of comparative advantage is
consistent with the coexistence of public and private schools in most Chilean communes.
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One of the most important questions confronting education policy makers is
whether the efficiency of the education system could be improved by introducing some
degree of competition into the supply of education services. Friedman (1955) argued that
private schools are inherently more efficient than publicly operated schools, and advocated
a competitive system of publicly-funded student vouchers in which parents have free choice
among schools. Recently, the voucher idea has gained increasing credence in the United
States. Several cities, including Milwaukee, have introduced freedom of choice for certain
students at the taxpayers' expense (Rouse (1998), Greene, J. P., Peterson, P. E., & Du, J.
(1998), Hoxby (2001)). Similarly, the State of Florida has introduced a plan that provides
vouchers to students in low-performing school districts (Figlio and Rouse, 2000). Charter
schools in Michigan and Arizona also seak to increase freedom of choice and capture the
expected benefits of such reforms ( Hoxby, 2002). Nevertheless, vouchers and choice
reforms are still controversial, and as yet no state or district has made them available to all
students.
In 1981, Chile introduced a massive reform to its education system that included a
voucher program similar in spirit to Friedman's "ideal" system. In particular, under the
Chilean system parents can send their children to public schools, or to private schools that
agree to take a voucher as full payment for the cost of education
1. Private schools have
flourished under the Chilean voucher system, and  now account for 36% of elementary
enrollment in the country.
                                                          
1 Starting on 1996, private subsidized schools were allowed to charge for tuition. The value of the voucher
they received was reduced to account for the increase in resources received through tuition.2
In this paper, I use the unique experiences of Chile to provide new evidence on the
central question of whether private schools are indeed more efficient
2 than publicly
operated schools. Several features of the Chilean system make this a particularly useful
exercise. First, relatively high quality data are available on student and school
characteristics, and on school-wide average standardized national test scores. Second,
unlike the limited voucher programs in the U.S., vouchers in Chile are available to all
families, and are indeed used by a wide range of families.
The results of my analysis suggest that public schools are neither uniformly worse
nor uniformly better than private schools. Rather, public schools appear to be relatively
more effective for students from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Such a system of
comparative advantage is consistent with the observation that public and private schools
continue to co-exist in most Chilean communes. Moreover, it is consistent with other
features of the Chilean data, including the under-representation of disadvantaged students
in the private schools (despite the fact that these schools are free), and in larger class sizes
in private versus public schools.
                                                          
2 Throughout the text the word efficient is used to refer to the school with higher scores. The assumption is
that all resources, or most of them, are those linked with the fixed per student subsidy and therefore one could
think that they achieve more “output” at the same “cost”.3
2.  Education System in Chile
In 1981 the Chilean military government implemented a voucher-style system of
publicly funded education (i.e. fixed per pupil subvention) that transfers funds from the
central government to both public and private schools on an equal basis
34. In order to be
eligible to receive voucher payments, subsidized schools must meet certain minimal safety,
attendance, infrastructure, and curriculum requirements. Until 1996 they were not allowed
to charge tuition. The per pupil voucher is paid on a monthly basis by the central
government directly to the school in the case of private subsidized schools and to the
municipality in the case of public schools
5. The per student stipend is independent of the
public or private status of the schools, but varies somewhat across regions, this variation is
geared towards benefiting otherwise disadvantaged areas of the country.
Overall demand-side selection in the Chilean voucher system is lower than any of
the experiences observed abroad. Public and private subsidized schools compete for the
same kind of students, those that can’t or don’t pay the private tuition costs, reducing
demand side selection. Furthermore, there is no restriction on the location of the school the
child can attend. Except for the time constraint and safety issues, children can travel free of
charge to any part of town to attend the school of their choice
6.
                                                          
3 For a detailed description of the Chilean education system and its reform see Gauri (1998), Tessada (2000),
Cox (1997) or Bravo, Contreras, and Sanhueza  (1999).
4 It is quite important to mention that the political scenario in which this national policy was implemented was
fundamental in making it possible. Trying to replicate the same policy under alternative political conditions
than those that existed in Chile during the early 1980's may require more convincing empirical evidence.
5 This is different from the traditional voucher given to the student. Benefits of student based voucher: student
families really understand that they can hold schools accountable and exert their “voice and exit” behaviour to
increase  their  children’s  education.  Additionally,  it  allows  differentiating  between  students  needs.  The
benefits of school based vouchers is that lower administrative costs and the possibility of making the benefit a
function of school characteristics.
6 This freedom of choice between schools is less for younger children since it is probable that their families4
On the supply side, slots at public school are rationed on a first come first serve
basis. Public schools cannot select students using tests or interviews, unless there is excess
demand
7. The same is not true for private subsidized schools, that tend to select students
according to family characteristics and previous performance. This introduces potential
selection bias that has to be incorporated in the model and interpretation of the results.
The expected benefits of introducing this pro-choice reform are two-fold. Initially, it
increases the supply of private subsidize schools, which are assumed (by many) to be more
efficient in providing education services give their structure and profit  miximixing
objective. Secondly, and most importantly it introduces competition between schools which
should induce an overall increase in the quality of education as schools “fight” to attract
and keep the best students.
In the Chilean context, the first effect of the free-choice reform was observed
intantaneously as te number of private subsidized schools flourished in the early 80’s. The
second effect is less clear, atleast for the public schools whose internal organization reduces
the potential benefits of the voucher program from induced competition. Public schools
depend on the municipal government and the voucher is paid to the municipality, not to the
school. The municipality then allocates school expenditures between all the schools that
depend on them. Principals can influence expenditure decisions by lobbying, but they don’t
have a formal right over the funds. Profits or losses are returned to the municipality and are
distributed between the schools. Therefore, school personnel do not reap the benefits or
                                                                                                                                                                                
will not want them to travel around the city alone and going with them is costly.
7 The best public schools that have excess demand do select students on the basis of their “quality”.5
costs of inefficient education provision. In general, schools are not perceived badly if they
have deficits and principals are not held accountable for the education outcomes.
Additionally, “cream-skimming” by private schools affects the public schools
performance in several ways. First, it drains the public schools of the best students,
immediately affecting test scores negatively. Additionally, the group of students that stays
in the public schools may perform worse because of negative peer effects. Second, the
incentives faced by public schools to increase quality may be reduced since the remaining
students are "locked in" and cannot exercise the exit option that would drive competition-
induced improvements.
Even if such “cream skimming” effect is not as big to overcome the competition
effect it is not clear that schools would actually compete on the basis of quality. In theory,
families choose schools on the basis of quality normally measured by student performance
in national standardized tests or labor markets. The availability and reliability of either
measure of quality is not good given the lack and lag
8 of such information and families are
left choosing on the basis of names, infraestructure and “gutt” instinct, therefore reducing
the real pressure of competition to compete on the basis of quality.
3.  Key Issues
3.1. School selection or non-random assignment of students
Assessing the achievement differential between school types requires comparing the
outcome variable Ti,PS and Ti.PU (i.e. test score, future wage, entry to college rate, etc.) of the
                                                          
8 In Chile the test scores were kept confidential in the 80’s and when they became public they were not easily
available to the families. Public measures of labor market performance by school are inexistent.6
same student i in both types of schools (private subsidized (PS) and public (PU)). To infer
causality, assignment into schools must be random. In such cases (i.e. in actual randomized
experiments), the treatment effect on the treated is given by the difference in the average
outcomes between public and private schools:
Treatment on the treated:  t|PS=1=E(Ti,PS|PS=1)-E(Ti,PU|PS=1)
Treatment on the not treated:  t|PS=0=E(Ti,PS|PS=0)-E(Ti,PU|PS=0)
With non-experimental data the treatment effect is not observable. We do not
observe the outcome variable of the treatment group if not treated E(Ti,PU|PS=1) or of the
control group if treated E(Ti,PS|PS=0) (i.e. the outcome of private (public) school students if
they went to public (private) schools). This is so because students will sort and be selected
into schools according to unobservable characteristics that are correlated with performance
and thus will not be comparable.
Student selection or non random assignment may result from several processes. In
the  first place,  self  selection  or  sorting of  students  into  schools  may  arise  from  the
discretion granted to families to choose schools and the way in which they  make their
choices. Family  and school characteristics may be systematically  related,  resulting in a
segmented educational system in which students from similar backgrounds will attend the
same schools and hardly ever have contact with students from other realities. For instance,
less educated families may invest less in the school choice decision and hence,  be less
informed than families that place greater value on educating their children. Alternatively,
the screening of students through family interview, previous achievement, etc., will result
in  nonrandom  selection.  Schools  affected  by  the  competition  induced  by  the  voucher7
system (i.e. mostly private schools, because of their organizational structure), will accept
and attract students that raise the perceived quality of the school (i.e. by increasing the test
score and presence in higher achievement-SES segment of the population), which attracts
more  and  better  students.  Additionally,  the  relative  institutional  uniqueness of  private
schools may also be an artifact of the student population. Schools develop reputations in
communities: “Better schools will attract better students and teachers”. The quality of the
students, in terms of both achievement and behavior, may allow for greater administrative
restraint, more teacher autonomy, and greater satisfaction among personel. And further, all
these  factors  may  not  only  affect,  but also be  affected  by  student  achievement in a
reciprocal causal  process.  Another  source of  selection comes  from  only  considering
students  that  have  kept  up  with  their  grade. In  other  words,  those  that  flunk are  not
observed and therefore not included in the estimation.
With non-experimental data, estimated treatment effects may be biased due to
omitted relevant variables that are correlated both with the type of school they assist and
their performance at any school. In terms of the notation introduced above, non-random
assignment will indicate that the term in parenthesis is non-zero:
to=E(Ti,PS|PS=1)-E(Ti,PU|PS=0)= t|PS=1+[E(Ti,PU|PS=1)-E(Ti,PU|PS=0)]
If selection is on unobservables, this bias cannot be eliminated through regression
adjusting. This occurs when we do not observe the variables that determine assignment and
when such variables are related with the outcome variable (such as IQ that influences the
school decision and also the expected outcome). In this case, techniques such as IV8
estimates and first stage selection models included in second stage outcome estimates are
used to obtain bias free estimates. But finding good instruments is not a trivial task.
Fortunately, identification is possible if we assume selection on observables. In this
case, the assignment mechanism conditional on the observable variables (X) is comparable
to a randomized experiment (Rubin 1977). The bracket term in the above equation is still
not zero because assignment is non-random but we observe the variables that determine




The assumption made is that since treatment is dependent on observables, one can
take assignment to treatment conditional on X as a random variable, just like in an
experiment. Therefore, comparing the outcomes for two schools with identical observable
characteristics, one of which is private subsidized and the other public, is like comparing
those two schools in a randomized experiment. This is what most of the previous studies
have done. They have included an extensive list of variables in the outcome equation trying
to control for all sources of selection bias that results from observable characteristics.
As with other studies, accounting for selection bias will be an important task of this
paper. However, as was explained earlier, thanks to the design of the voucher system in
Chile, it is lessened. In addition, I make use of an unusually large set of controls taken from
the merge of the school data sets with household surveys to further control for. This9
individual-level socioeconomic data allows the modeling of selection explicitly, and its
introduction in a second stage equation of test scores. Finally, models controlling for
unobserved selection assuming joint normality of the error terms are run using one and two
latent factor models a la Heckman.
Unfortunately, student level data of the outcome variable is not available, and
therefore the analysis will be limited to school averages. This implies that the within-school
variation cannot be used.
3.2.  Standardized Test Scores as the Outcome Measure
Another key element to consider is the selection of a measure for the relative
effectiveness of schools. What is it that we want from schools? Better standardized test
scores, better wages, better social skills, lower criminality, etc… Even though all these are
desirable outputs, this paper will use standardized test scores as a partial measure of quality.
Test scores have the advantage of allowing objective comparisons. The use of 4
th grade test
scores limits the amount of other factors that might be playing a role in explaining the
outcome. That is, since education is cumulative, test scores for higher grades or even
university degrees or PAA
9 scores, would require controls for switching between schools
and other external factors which might influence the result. Similarly, when using wages,
there might be factors, such as luck and personal contacts, involved in the outcome that we
can’t control for. Furthermore, there are studies that show that achievement test scores are
positively correlated with future labor market outcomes.
                                                          
9 PAA is equivalent to SAT in US.10
All the analisis presented in the paper considers math test scores as the endogenous
variable.  Results using language scores are not too different and therefore are omitted.
Furthermore, math scores are used because past research has shown that they are more
related to school characteristics and future earnings (Murnane et al. 1985, Madaus et al.
1979 and Barro 2001).
On the down side, there is some evidence that test scores are a short-term measure
of school effectiveness. For example, teachers may train students to perform well on a
particular type of test, without any long-term effects on human capital accumulation. (They
even may select the better students to take the test, or give out the answers). Also,
availability of better teachers and more school resources may not have an impact on the test
scores in the short run, but may have an influence in the long run.
4.  Estimation Strategy
A school can be thought of as a firm that is producing an output (in our case, test
score (T)), with a set of observed (X) and unobserved inputs (m). The production function
for both types of schools can be expressed as:
(1)  j i PS PS j i PS j i PS X T , , , , , m b a + ¢ + =
(2)  j i PU PU j i PU j i PU X T , , , , , m b a + ¢ + =
Where: PS=Private School, PU= Public School, i=1-N schools and j=1-J students.11
Selection can be modeled by assuming that the attendance to PS school, or
treatment, is a linear function of observable characteristics W and an error (n).
(3)  [ ] 0 ' 1 , , , > + P = j i j i j i W PS n
Since I do  not  have  student  level data,  estimates are  based  on  school-based
aggregations. Mean test score is the  dependent variable  and mean  school,  teacher,  and
student characteristics are the independent variables. In terms of equation (1)-(3) we will be
estimating the following:
(1')  i PS PS i PS i PS X T , , m b a + ¢ + =
(2')  j i PU PU i PU i PU X T , , , m b a + ¢ + =
(3')  [ ] 0 1 > + P ¢ = i i i W S P n
Where the overbars represent school means. For ease of notation, the overbars will be
ommited in the rest of the paper. All variables with sub index i and no j are school means.
4.1. Case I: Random Treatment Assignment or No Selection Bias
The first set of models estimate the treatment effect by assuming that assignment to
treatment is random or not correlated with the outcome variable (i.e. test scores). For such
purpose we assume that mi and ni are iid and E(mi|Xi,ni) = E(mi|Xi) = 0. In this case, the
population regression function and the regression functions for the observed subsamples are
identical.
(4)  [ ] [ ] PS i PS i i PS i i i PS X X T E PS X T E b a ¢ + = = = | 1 , | , ,12
(5)  [ ] [ ] PU i PU i i PU i i i PU X X T E PS X T E b a ¢ + = = = | 0 , | , ,
Therefore, the treatment effect or relative efficiency differential can be simply
calculated as the difference between the mean test scores conditional on the observable
characteristics in private and public schools. In this case, the estimation of equation (6) by
OLS leads to an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
(6)  [ ] [ ] ( ) PU PS i PU PS i PU i PS X X T E X T E b b a a - ¢ + - = - | |
Equation (6) estimates the impact on the test score of being in a private school, with
respect  to a  public  school,  controlling  for  observed  family,  student  and  school
characteristics. In theory, the coefficient measures what happens to the test score if we take
a  public  school,  with  its  students,  teachers  and  families  intact,  and  transform  it  into a
private school by changing its administration, but not its resources. Alternatively stated, the
coefficient provides the test score difference between two identical schools, except for the
fact that one is private and the other public
10.
Previous studies for Chile have estimated an additive constant treatment effect,
which in terms of equation (6) implies that they are restricting the b's of both types of
schools to be equal but allowing the a's to vary. In other words, they are assuming that the
production functions are parallel and that their difference between the test scores (treatment
effect) is constant and equal to the difference between the a's.
Most of these constant treatment effect estimates for Chile conclude that private
subsidized schools generate either higher test scores or not significantly different from
                                                          
10 It must be noted that this methodology may be flawed by the fact the resources are endogenous to school13
those from public schools. For example, Rodriguez (1988), using a sample of 281 schools
in the metropolitan area concludes that private schools outperform public ones in the 1984
PER exam. Aedo and Larrañaga (1994), using data on 1990-91 and Mizala et. al. (1997 and
2000), using data for 1994-95 and 1996 find positive or no difference in test scores between
school types.  Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999) use data from 1982 onwards to run a
series of cross sectional regressions similar to equation (6), finding that the performance
gap favorable to private schools is positive for the earlier years but decreases and turns
insignificant for the later ones. Winkler and Rounds (1993) analyze school expenditures
and conclude that private schools are more efficient. However, Parry (1996) finds no
significant difference between the achievement of both types of schools.  Schiefelbein
(1991) and Rodriguez (1988) found that non-profit private subsidized schools provide
higher quality education than profit maximizing private subsidized schools.
In terms of the model that is being estimated it corresponds to some version of
equation (7), where the treatment effect is  g=aPS-aPU and corresponds to the absolute
advantage model in which private schools are assumed to be more efficient for all types of
students.
(7)  i i i PU i X PS T m b g a + ¢ + + =
 However, linearity and  additivity of the treatment effect are not necessary
assumptions. A more realistic scenario is to assume that the achievement differential varies
with observable characteristics. If the organizational differences of private subsidized
schools make them more prone to competition and more adjustable to students needs, and
                                                                                                                                                                                
type (see Filmer and Prittchet, 1999).14
thus more efficient than public schools, one might expect that their advantage will be
higher the more resources they have to adjust to changing needs.  This is so because if they
are resource constrained they will be less likely to adjust and therefore be much more like
public schools. Another possibility is that since private schools will select the “better”
11
students, they will be likely to direct their efforts and resources towards meeting the needs
of these “better” students and not those of the “worst” ones. Therefore, one might expect
that the benefits for students from less advantaged backgrounds of attending a private
school are relatively lower conditional on being admitted.
To capture the possibility of differential effects by school-teacher-family
characteristics under the selection on observables assumption, I estimate equation (8). The
inclusion of interaction terms is an innovation to previous literature that increases flexibility
in the estimation and allows for heterogeneous treatment effects. The treatment effect is
equal to g + X'id = aPS-aPU + X'i(bPS-bPU).
(8)  i i i i PU i PU i X PS PS X T m d g b a + ¢ + + ¢ + =
Equation (8) allows for the estimation of the distribution of the effect, which is not
possible for in previous estimates of production functions similar to equation (7). It is my
opinion that if treatment is in fact heterogeneous one must not only observe averages but
also the distribution of the effects. If one believes that the winners from these types of
school choice policies are students from less advantaged areas, as school choice proponents
do, then one should look specifically at the effects on those students, which might be
                                                          
11 Better refers to students coming from families with higher education and income.15
different from that of students from less disadvantaged backgrounds. This is what equation
8 is capturing.
4.2.  Case II: Non Random Treatment Assignment
The last set of estimations consider the possibility of non-random assignment by
assuming that F(mPS, mPU, n) is a trivariate normal distribution. In this case assignment and
test scores are no longer independent and therefore the population regressions differs from
the observed samples regressions by  E[mPS,i|Xi,ni] and E[mPU,i|Xi,ni]. But by using the
properties of the normal distribution that term can be calculated and included in the
regression:
(9)  [ ] [ ] i i i PS PS i PS i i i X E X PS X T E n m b a , | 1 , | , + ¢ + = =
(10)  [ ] [ ] P ¢ - > + ¢ + = = i i i i PS PS i PS i i i W X E X PS X T E n m b a , | 1 , | ,








, 1 , |
Analogously for public schools:
(12)  [ ] [ ] P ¢ - < + ¢ + = = W X E X PS X T E i i i PU PU i PU i i i n m b a , | 0 , | ,



































Following Heckman (1979) the l's are computed by running a first stage probit
model of P(X) as a function of individual SES variables ( Wi) and using the estimated
coefficients in the l's formulas. The treatment effect can then be computed as the difference
between (12) and (13). The estimated treatment effect will differ from the one estimated by
OLS because it will include an additional term that controls for the selection bias (rm,PS,nlPS
- rm,PU,nlPU).
4.2.1.  1-Factor Model of Latent Test Scores or Absolute Advantage
One common assumption made in these models is that the correlation between test
score and assignment (r's) of both types of schools is the same. In this case, following the
absolute advantage story, students selecting one kind of school (i.e. private) would
outperform the other students in any type of school. That is, if there is positive selection
into private schools ( r(mps,n)>0) there must be negative selection into public schools
(r(mpu,n)>0). Thus, the expected test score for the subsample of students that go to private
schools exceeds the population expectations (E(Ti/Xi , PS=1)>E(Ti/Xi)) and the opposite is
true for public school students (E(Ti/Xi , PS=0)<E(Ti/Xi)), implying that the treatment
effect estimates that ignore the selection bias are upward biased.
To be consistent with the above estimates, we estimate the constant and
heterogeneous treatment effects with equal r's from equations (15) and (16).17
(15) 
[ ] [ ] ( )
[ ] [ ]
) 1 (
0 , | 1 , |
0 , | 1 , |
F - F
+ = = - =
- + - = = - =
f
r g
l l r a a
PS X T E PS X T E
PS X T E PS X T E
i i i i
PU PS PU PS i i i i
(16)  [ ] [ ]
) 1 (
0 , | 1 , |
F - F
+ ¢ + = = - =
f
r d g i i i i i X PS X T E PS X T E
4.2.2.  2-Factor Model of Latent Test Scores or Comparative Advantage
In contrast to the absolute advantage story, students may select the schools that
benefit them the most and therefore there could be positive selection into both types of
schools. To allow for this we let r(mps,n)  to differ from r(mpu,n). In the case of positive
selection into PS and PU ( r(mps,n)>0 and  r(mpu,n)<0)) we would have  E(Ti/Xi,
PS=1)>E(Ti/Xi) and E(Ti/Xi , PS=0)>E(Ti/Xi), and the impact on the treatment effect will
be ambiguous.
The models estimated in this case correspond to equations (17) and (18).
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5.  The Data
The data used come from the Ministry of Education and the Socioeconomic
Household survey. The school level data sets of the Ministry provide outcome variables
(i.e. test scores) as well as school and teacher characteristics. Student characteristics are
obtained from the Household Socio-Economic Surveys (CASEN). The data sets are merged18
together by using the school id number. Only elementary schools are included in the
analysis in order to limit the uncontrolled switching between schools and the cumulative
aspect of education. Below is an outline of the data sets and variables.
Data Sets:
Ministry of Education Data Sets: All data is school level, no individual observations
on students
1.  Simce Enrollment directory
2.  Teachers Directory




th Grade average math and Spanish test scores
2.  Administrative Dependence: Municipal, Private Subsided, Private
3.  Enrollment (total, per grade, male, female)
4.  Number of students per class (per grade/total)
5.  Number of teachers per school
6.  Percentage of titled teachers
7.  Number of years teaching
8.  Number of hours per teacher (real and contract)
9.  Percentage of male teachers
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Students
1.  Vulnerability Index: Function of mother education and a group of health indicators for
the child (dental cavities, malnutrition, hearing problems, eye problems and posture
problems).
CASEN (Socioeconomic characteristic household survey) Variables:
1.  Household size (number of people in family)
2.  Poverty line (rank 1-3 with respect to poverty line)
3.  Total household income
2.  Father’s Education (years, degrees)
3.  Mother’s Education (years, degrees)
4.  Students age, grade and sex
The focus of this paper will be on the 1996 cross section of schools. Unfortunately,
since the data do not cover the period before the vouchers were implemented there is no
good reason to use the data in a time series way.19
When using the Ministry of Education data sets we are able to identify 5630 schools
whose dependency composition mimics that of the universe of schools, that is 61.5%
correspond to public, 29% to private subsidized and 9.5% to paid private schools.
Unfortunately the information available on family background is very scarce
12. In an
attempt to make results less susceptible to selection bias we averaged family characteristics
from the household survey data at the school level
13. (To increase precision both surveys
for 1996 and 1998 were merged to calculate the average family characteristics assuming
that there is not much change between those years). The surveys do not allow us to match
all schools contained in the ministry of education data, further restricting our sample to
3500 to 4000 schools, of which 57% are public schools, 34% private subsidized schools
and 9.1% private paid schools. When testing for non-random exclusion of schools we find
no statistical significant difference between the coefficients of the restricted and
unrestricted samples.
Table 1 presents the sample means of the school, teacher and student characteristics
of the three types of schools. Private subsidized schools don’t appear to have better learning
conditions than public schools. They tend to be larger (in terms of enrollment) and with
larger classes (calculated as the number of students enrolled per grade divided by the
amount of classes in each grade). One could argue that these conditions are detrimental to
education if personalized teaching is beneficial. Of course, economies of scale,
compensatory classes and measurement errors point in the opposite direction.
                                                          
12  The only SES information available from the ministry is the vulnerability index, parental education index,
and average family spending in schooling index.
13 Most of the other studies done with chilean data restrict the variables to those available from the ministry.
The rest, rely on in-school surveys to include additional variables on student-family-school characteristics.
Unfortunately, these surveys are non universal and the samples get restricted substantially.20
Percentage of male teachers, years of experience, hours worked/contractual hours
and percentage of teachers measure teacher characteristics in this data with a degree in
education
14. Again, private subsidized schools don’t have “better” teachers: They have
relatively fewer teachers with a degree in education and teachers with less years of
experience, working on average fewer hours. They also have a higher percentage of female
teachers.
Selection based on observables is still present and evident from the means presented
in family background characteristics in table 1. Private subsidized and public schools tend
to attract student from a lower socioeconomic status than private schools (as measured by
higher parental income and education, lower vulnerability index), and between private
subsidized and public schools there is still some sorting going on. Children from relatively
better family backgrounds appear to be attracted or captured by private subsidized schools.
The observed differences in resources and student characteristics plague direct
outcome comparisons with selection bias.  The 5-6 percentage point difference in private
subsidized and public schools' average test scores could very possibly just be the effect of
non-random assignment of students into schools (i.e. of having better students and not
really teaching them better).
Graph 1 shows the distribution for 4
th grade math scores in 1996 by school type. It
is evident from the graph that the public schools concentrate in lower achieving portions of
the distribution, while private paid schools do so in higher achieving portions. Private
                                                          
14 This measure is not so indicative of the teaher’s quality, some measure of wages would also be desirable
but is unavailable. With respect to teachers with university degrees, the data allows for controlling what type
of degree they have (i.e. education, physics, etc) and even though one could think that having a degree in
some other area (not education) may be more beneficial to teaching than having an education degree, I believe21
subsidized schools lie in the middle. In terms of standard deviation of the test scores,
private paid schools have the lowest inter school variance, followed by public schools and
private subsidized schools, respectively.  When testing for equal distributions, we cannot
reject equality between public and private subsidized schools score distributions at a 95%
confidence. The private paid score distribution is significantly different from both private
subsidized and public score distributions. This simple test corroborates the previous
statements assuming less dispersion within PS and PU schools, than with private paid
schools. Together with the following description on the school-family-teacher
characteristics, it helps explains why the working sample will be limited to PS and PU
schools only. Private paid schools are excluded from the analysis because of its inherently
different distribution of family as well as school characteristics that make comparisons
misleading.
 Table 2 computes the relative performance within sub-samples as a first approach
to reducing the bias in the computed differentials. The first thing worth noticing is that
there are several large and negative relative difference indicators for private subsidized
schools (with respect to public schools). When stratifying the sample by socio-economic
status, as measured by average parental education, maternal education or vulnerability
index, one observes that public schools cater to low SES families, private subsidized
schools do so for intermediate SES families, and paid private schools do so for high SES
families. As expected, test scores increase as the average SES variable increase. Within
those categories, private subsidized school’s relative advantage over public schools remains
only for higher SES groups, but reverses for lower SES groups.
                                                                                                                                                                                
that this is true for older children and therefore just include the degree in education information.22
Private schools tend to concentrate in urban areas (50% of the schools in the urban
area are private subsidized and paid). 81% of the rural schools are public. The relative
advantage of private schools over public schools remains only in urban areas. In rural areas,
public schools have on average 2-3% score advantage over private subsidized schools
15.
One possible explanation is that in rural areas the selection of students is lessened, as well
as the average SES of the student’s families, and therefore private subsidized schools no
longer have better students to educate.
With respect to class size (both total and 4
th grade) public schools have an
advantage over private subsidized schools in smaller classes, but not in bigger classes. Not
surprisingly, they normally have smaller class sizes.
Graphs 2 through 5 show the trend lines from scatter plots for average school 4
th
grade math score by log of household income, log of parental income, maternal education
and vulnerability index. Consistently it is found that for any one of this measures of
parental background, private subsidized schools perform better than public schools only
when the students come from a less disadvantaged background (i.e. higher maternal
income, higher log household income, etc). That is, if we choose to compare the average
test score for schools with students that come from the less advantaged families, we would
find that public school’s achievement is higher, and the opposite is true for students coming
from higher socioeconomic status. These findings are consistent with the comparative
advantage theory. It is not that private schools have an absolute advantage on producing
                                                          
15 This observation is of great importance and stands as a future extension to the analysis in this working
paper.23
higher test scores; they only have a comparative advantage in teaching children that come
from better socioeconomic background.
Given the characteristics of the students attending each type of school, it appears
that the different types of schools specialize in a manner best suited to the educational
needs of their respective student bodies. That is, private subsidized schools attract higher
income/parental education students and public schools attracts lower income/parental
education students because they can perform relatively better than the other type of school
with students with similar socioeconomic characteristics.
6.  Estimation of the Treatment Effect
6.1.  Case I: Random Assignment
This section estimates the models presented in section 5. I allow the effect of private
schools on test score to vary by the observable characteristics of schools, families, and
students. The production functions present the predicted test scores at each set of teacher-
family-school characteristics and the difference between them is the test score gain (or loss)
of private subsidized schools over public schools at each of this sets of characteristics (i.e.
the treatment effect). Since the treatment effect is likely to be heterogeneous, it is better to
present the distribution of the effects and not just the average effect or the treatment on the
treated or not treated effect. Estimations based on equation (8) that allow for heterogeneous
treatment effects (i.e. different slope and intercepts) allow the identification of the
distribution of the effects, which is a more complete and relevant result.24
To maintain consistency and comparability with previous research, models like the
one in equation (7) are also estimated. The inclusion of models based on equation (8) is an
innovation to earlier research and is presented after the traditional estimations.
Table 3 presents the estimated “intercept effect” as controls and interaction terms
are sequentially added in the model. The effect presented in the first three rows is
theoretically equivalent to the average treatment effect estimated in previous studies
(except for the differences in samples and controls used), since it estimates equation (7)
without allowing for heterogeneous effects by not including interaction terms. The results
are consistent with previous studies: As we move towards more inclusive models we find
that the magnitude of the treatment effect (i.e. the gain of private subsidized schools over
public schools in test scores) diminishes from 4.07 to -0.14 points. This diminution reflects
the selection effect mentioned above, that is, private subsidized schools select and attract
“better students”, therefore the uncontrolled effect is upward biased. It is also worth
mentioning that when the school controls are included with no SES controls the effect is
bigger since, as shown in table 1, the school characteristics of private subsidized are not
better than that of public schools.
It is interesting to observe that the effects are different according to the samples
analyzed. When urban and rural schools are merged, the effect after controlling for SES and
schoool characteritics turns to zero, but in the urban sample, even though the effect gets
smaller, it is still positive. The rural sample is quite different. As was seen in the raw data
(and consistently with what  Mizala and  Romaguera (2000) found), the differences in
performance between the schools is not significant even when the controls are added in.25
The fourth row of table 3 allows for heterogeneous treatment effects by including
interaction terms in the analysis. The model estimated corresponds to equation (8). The
interaction terms correspond to the multiplication of the private subsidized dummy and
some SES and school variables. Now, the coefficient for PS is no longer the average
treatment effect. It can be interpreted as the effect of being a private subsidized school at
the y axis or X equal 0. In all samples this effect is largely negative. Thus indicating that
the only way we can have an average treatment effect that is positive or null is that there
must be some positive effects along the X axis, implying the existence of heterogeneous
effects.
If we are socially motivated, what we are really interested in is the effect of the
policy in those kids that are in most need of better education
16. This motivates the
introduction of the heterogeneous treatment effect models to capture the differential effects
along the X-axis, and to be able to observe the predicted distribution of such effects.
Model IV in Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for the heterogeneous
treatment effect model. The first thing to notice is that the coefficients for the SES variables
(not interacted with PS dummy) are positive
17, and therefore there is an increase in the test
scores as students come from less disadvantaged backgrounds, or that the test score-SES
slope is positive for both types of schools. This is consistent with previous literature that
find that family characteristics matter in school achievement. Additionally, the PS*SES
                                                          
16 In theory the gains to “lower-end” students from the voucher system are not exclusive to attending the
private schools but to having the possibility to do so. It is this possibility of switching between schools that
increases competition and rises overall school quality (public and private). Unfortunately, we do not have data
on school quality before the voucher system was implemented and therefore cannot evaluate the impact on
education quality as a whole.
17 Note that the  vulnerability  index  increases as  the family  is more vulnerable,  and  therefore a  negative
coefficient is consistent with having better test scores for schools with less vulnerable students.26
interaction coefficients are positive (again except for the vulnerability index by
construction) implying that as the socioeconomic characteristics of the students’ families
get better the increase in test scores in private subsidized schools is higher than in public
schools. In other words, the test score-SES slope of the private subsidized schools is larger.
Graph 6 confirms the above findings, and those presented in the raw data analysis,
by showing the predicted test scores for private subsidized and public school for 5
representative households. Households 1 to 5 are ranked from least to most rich, educated
and invulnerable
18. The treatment effect (or gain at private subsidized schools) for each
representative household is TPS,i-TPU,i, or the difference between the lines.
Just as the simple plots of the raw data suggested, there is a negative treatment
effect on students from less advantaged backgrounds. This negative effect is reduced as the
characteristics of the families get better and turns positive for the less disadvantaged
families.
In sum, these results suggest that private subsidized schools have a comparative
advantage in teaching students from more advantaged background, but not all students as is
commonly believed. It will not be beneficial for less educated/income families to put their
children in private subsidized schools. In fact, they will do better (on average) in a public
school than in a comparable private subsidized school. This raises the question of what do
public schools have that makes them “better” than private subsidized schools for low SES
students. Or, inversely, what do private subsidized schools do differently  that benefit
                                                          
18 Household 3 corresponds to the mean household.27
students from a higher SES family. These questions can be in part answered by analyzing
the coefficients of the school-teacher variables in Table 4.
In general, the sign and magnitudes of the control coefficients show what
characteristics are related to better achievement. Additionally, the regression results for
each school type show how the different characteristics affect achievement in different
ways. In terms of school characteristics, school size, teacher experience, teacher education
certification and percentage of female teacher are all positively related to higher test scores.
The average number of hours worked by the teachers is negative but not statistically
significant.
Additionally, consistent with international evidence and other studies for Chile
(Romaguera and Mizala (1998) and Romaguera, Mizala and Farren (1997)), when public
and private subsidized schools are considered together, same sex schools have significantly
higher average test scores than mixed schools. When looking at the regressions by school
type, we find that boys’ only private subsidized schools, have better performance than girls
only and they both do better than mixed schools. This is not the case for public schools,
were girls schools perform better, followed by mixed schools and finally boys schools.
One interesting result is that class size is negatively related to test scores in public
schools but positive in private subsidized schools. This can be seen in model IV (i.e.
significantly negative class size coefficient and significantly positive and bigger coefficient
for class size interacted with PS dummy). It can also be seen from the regressions run on
each type of school separately.28
One possible explanation (to the different sign in the class size effect), is that public
schools are more limited by infrastructure and therefore, increases in school size translate
into over-crowded classrooms. Another possibility is that the causal relation goes in the
other direction: better schools attract more students and therefore, the classes get larger. It
is also possible that better student groups don’t need to have personalized attention, as do
less advantaged students. Peer effects may be larger in private schools because they are
composed of students from better socioeconomic backgrounds, and this effect is relatively
stronger than the small class size effect.
As mentioned earlier, the signs of the socioeconomic characteristics coefficients are
as expected. Schools with students with higher parental education and income tend to
perform better, on average, in the 4
th grade achievement test. The coefficient for
vulnerability index is negative and significant in all models and samples, implying that
schools with more vulnerable students on average do worse.  Consistently with previous
studies, maternal education matters more than paternal education for achievement.
The above results are also observed in the separate regressions for public and
private subsidized schools. Maternal  education, vulnerability index, household income,
relationship with the poverty line are significant in all specifications. Paternal education is
negatively correlated with test scores in public schools but positively correlated in private
subsidized schools.
7.2.    Case II: Non Random Treatment Assignment
The above results rely on the assumption that selection/sorting into schools is either
random or that it depends only on observable characteristics and therefore can be estimated29
treating them as random conditional on the X’s. The results in this section incorporate the
possibility of nonrandom assignment to treatment by assuming that  f(mps,  mpu,  n) is a
trivariate normal distribution
19 and using the characteristics of such distribution to compute
selection correction terms from a first stage probit regression for the probability of being in
a private subsidized school on individual SES variables (presented in table 5). The
correction terms are computed from the average predicted probabilities for each school.
Four second stage models are estimated. The first two assume that if students
perform better in one type of school they will do so in all types of schools and therefore
restricts the r’s (i.e. correlation between selection/sorting into PS and test scores) to be the
same for both types of schools. This is consistent with a 1-factor or absolute advantage
model. Within this framework constant and heterogenous effects’ models are estimated.
In both cases the r’s are negative and significant. Thus implying that unobserved
selection into private subsidized schools is negatively related to test scores in both private
and public schools. Therefore the observed test scores in private subsidized schools  is
below the expected test score for the population, and the opposite is true for the public
school test scores. The OLS treatment effect is downward biased by the omission of
selection correction terms.
The second set of estimates does not restricted the r’s to be equal, to allow for
comparative advantage type of sorting into schools. When the treatment effect is assumed
to be constant, the coefficients on the selection terms are still negative and significant.
Therefore, the average treatment effect from the OLS models are downward biased. But,
                                                          
19 See Heckman (1979) for a discussion on the importance and limitations of assuming a normal trivariate30
when the interaction terms are included in the model to allow for differential effects along
the X's, the selection coefficient for private schools turn positive and non significant
indicating that selection into private schools is mostly captured by the interaction terms on
the observable characteristics. On the other hand, the selection correction coefficient for
public schools is still negative and significant, implying that selection into public schools is
unaccounted for by controlling for observables and that it is positively related to test scores
in that type of schools. These findings are confirmed when running the regressions for each
type of school independently.
The direction of the bias is ambiguous since for both schools we observe upward
biased estimates of the population expectations. But since the effect in the public schools is
bigger in magnitude and significance it is probable that the uncorrected estimates are less
positive and more negative than the corrected effects.
Graph 7 shows the predicted test scores for public and private schools from the
estimation of the heterogeneous treatment effect model with  unequal  r's for five
representative households. The results are consistent with all previous results suggesting
that there is a positive treatment effect only for students that do not come from the worse
socioeconomic backgrounds.
8. Conclusions
This paper analyses the relative efficiency of private and public schools by looking
at elementary schools in Chile in 1996. By introducing a more detailed set of control
variables to account for selection and estimating models with selection correction terms "a
                                                                                                                                                                                
distribution of the error terms.31
la Heckman" this paper has dealt with the traditional pitfalls of most of the studies of
private versus public education: Selection Bias. Moreover, by introducing interaction terms
of the observable characteristics and the private dummy it allows for the estimation of
heterogeneous treatment effects and its distribution and not just an average treatment effect
as all of the previous studies using Chilean data have done.
The results suggest that public schools are neither uniformly worse nor uniformly
better than private schools. Rather, public schools appear to be relatively more effective for
students from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Such a system of comparative advantage
is consistent with the observation that public and private schools continue to co-exist in
most Chilean communes. Moreover, it is consistent with other features of the Chilean data,
including the under-representation of disadvantaged students in the private schools (despite
the fact that these schools are free), and in larger class sizes in private versus public
schools.
The paper does not analyze the possible reazons why this system of comparative
advantage has emerged in the chilean education system. This will be left as the subject of
future research.
The findings lead to policy recommendations that differ from those traditionally
proposed. Since it is not true that public schools are worse, it is not necessary to eliminate
them, as some have suggested. Additionally, since they are an important service to less
advantaged kids, not only must we not eliminate them but also design policies focalized on
those schools.32
PS PU PP
Average Scores 69 66 84
Std. Deviation 12 10 7
Test for Equal Distributions (Komogorov-Smirnov)
PU vs PS 1.000
PU vs PP 0.006 *
PS vs PP 0.010 *
* Reject Equal Distribution at 95% Confidence
Graph #1 Distribution of the Average 4th Grade 


























































































Graph #2 Plot of Math Score * Log Household Income
Graph #3 Plot of Math Score * Log Parental Income
Graph #4 Plot of Math Score * Mother Education
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1 2 3 4 5
Vulnerability Index 100 75 50 25 0
Number of people in the household 10 8 6 4 2
Poverty line index 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Log of Household Total Income 6 8 12 14 17
maternal education 0 4 8 12 18
paternal education 0 4 8 12 18
Graph #6. Predicted Test Scores for Five Representative Households
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1 2 3 4 5
Vulnerability Index 100 75 50 25 0
Number of people in the household 10 8 6 4 2
Poverty line index 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Log of Household Total Income 6 8 12 14 17
maternal education 0 4 8 12 18
paternal education 0 4 8 12 18
Predicted Probability of being a Private School 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Graph #7. Predicted Test Scores for Five Representative Households From the Selection Models
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N Mean N Mean N Mean
School Characteristics
rural dummy 3470 0.53 1635 0.21 525 0.12
4th grade enrollment 3470 44.89 1635 53.06 525 39.35
total enrollment 3441 353.28 1547 431.93 470 342.90
% of male only schools 3470 0.01 1635 0.02 525 0.05
% of female only schools 3470 0.01 1635 0.06 525 0.08
4th grade class size 2432 30.06 1313 34.83 465 24.50
class size 2727 31.06 1390 35.60 468 24.08
Teacher Characteristics
N. of years of teaching experience 3408 18.20 1588 12.60 451 10.96
Hours worked 3409 26.34 1588 24.07 451 23.27
Contractual hours 3409 31.89 1588 28.71 451 28.37
% of teachers with education degree 3409 0.97 1588 0.91 451 0.96
% of male teachers 3409 0.32 1588 0.28 451 0.26
Family Background Characteristics
Vulnerability Index 3466 59.83 1572 32.39 438 0.62
Number of people in a the household 2337 5.37 1330 5.06 402 4.75
Poverty line index  2336 2.46 1330 2.65 401 2.97
Age of the students 2337 10.34 1330 10.04 402 9.87
Education of the students 2337 4.33 1330 4.21 402 4.20
Dummy for full day school 2337 0.13 1330 0.12 402 0.27
Household Total Income 2033 266699.55 1145 411245.16 334 1678574.51
Maternal total income 2046 88964.40 1162 142515.77 347 563643.99
Paternal total income 2275 179317.01 1280 291994.66 379 1262193.18
maternal education 2322 7.74 1326 9.52 402 13.94
paternal education 2281 7.79 1285 9.82 380 14.67
maternal age 2330 37.91 1328 37.77 402 38.33
paternal age 2289 41.09 1287 40.74 380 41.86
parental education 2331 7.76 1328 9.65 402 14.27
parental total income 2323 253967.87 1322 407985.24 400 1684889.21
Test Scores 
Math 3440 66 1631 69 527 84
Spanish 3422 65 1616 70 523 84
Public Schools Private Subsidized Paid Private Schools37
Table 2
Average 4th Grade Test Scores by School Type
Private Subsidized
SCORE N. SCHOOLS SCORE N. SCHOOLS SCORE N. SCHOOLS PS/PU PP/PU
Average School Parental Education
NONE MATH SCORE 59 34 57 17 -4.0%
SPANISH SCORE 60 34 58 18 -2.5%
INCOMPLETE MATH SCORE 66 1985 64 514 70 4 -1.9%
ELEMENTARY SPANISH SCORE 66 1979 65 511 74 3 -1.7%
INCOMPLETE MATH SCORE 70 583 74 676 68 3 4.2%
HIGH SCHOOL SPANISH SCORE 71 582 75 673 72 3 5.2%
INCOMPLETE MATH SCORE 78 40 79 225 75 8 1.6%
COLLEGE SPANISH SCORE 79 40 81 223 79 8 2.2%
MORE MATH SCORE 85 7 81 4
SPANISH SCORE 86 7 81 4
MOTHER´S EDUCATION (CASEN)
INCOMPLETE MATH SCORE 64 2364 63 634 80 126 -2.2% 20.2%
ELEMENTARY SPANISH SCORE 64 2349 63 622 81 123 -1.4% 21.7%
COMPLETE  MATH SCORE 65 91 69 46 76 5 6.8% 15.2%
ELEMENTARY SPANISH SCORE 64 90 70 46 78 4 7.8% 17.2%
COMPLETE MATH SCORE 66 51 74 69 82 53 10.9% 19.5%
HIGH SCHOOL SPANISH SCORE 66 51 75 68 84 53 12.6% 21.8%
MORE THAN MATH SCORE 72 63 78 198 85 302 7.7% 15.2%
HIGH SCHOOL SPANISH SCORE 74 62 79 198 86 302 7.2% 14.1%
RURAL/URBAN
0 MATH SCORE 68 1643 72 1277 84 462 5.6% 19.3%
SPANISH SCORE 68 1639 73 1271 85 458 6.3% 19.6%
1 MATH SCORE 64 1797 62 354 82 65 -3.3% 22.2%
SPANISH SCORE 63 1783 62 345 83 65 -2.3% 24.0%
GIRLS SCHOOL
MATH SCORE 72 51 79 94 86 43 8.7% 15.8%
SPANISH SCORE 74 50 82 94 87 43 9.0% 15.1%
BOYS SCHOOL
MATH SCORE 71 31 81 32 86 30 12.6% 17.6%
SPANISH SCORE 71 29 81 32 86 30 11.9% 17.5%
VULNERABILITY INDEX
1 MATH SCORE 73 278 76 765 84 523 4.0% 13.2%
SPANISH SCORE 74 276 77 762 85 520 4.4% 12.7%
2 MATH SCORE 68 855 69 405 1.9%
SPANISH SCORE 68 855 70 400 2.2%
3 MATH SCORE 66 667 62 184 60 2 -4.8%
SPANISH SCORE 65 666 63 185 63 1 -4.8%
4 MATH SCORE 65 504 59 97 73 2 -11.1%
SPANISH SCORE 65 501 59 94 73 2 -9.9%
5 MATH SCORE 62 1136 56 180 -10.5%
SPANISH SCORE 61 1124 55 175 -10.8%
4TH GRADE CLASS SIZE
<16 MATH SCORE 63 1197 61 373 80 143 -2.6% 21.0%
SPANISH SCORE 62 1184 61 364 81 139 -0.9% 23.6%
>15 & <31 MATH SCORE 66 947 69 337 84 269 4.1% 21.8%
SPANISH SCORE 66 944 70 335 85 269 5.2% 22.4%
>30 MATH SCORE 68 1205 73 883 86 100 7.2% 21.4%
SPANISH SCORE 68 1203 74 879 87 100 7.9% 21.5%
Note: When sample size is too small, the relative difference is not computed.
Public Paid Private RELATIVE DIFFERENCE38
Impact of Sequentially Including Controls on the Estimated Intercept
PS coef. std error F-stat R2 adj
URBAN + RURAL Private Subsidized and Public Schools   N=2789
Uncontrolled 4.07 0.45 * 82.65 * 0.03
School Controls 4.77 0.52 * 37.65 * 0.12
SES Controls -0.14 0.50 75.67 * 0.30
-29.10 9.22 * 58.67 * 0.32
URBAN Private Subsidized and Public Schools   N=2219
Uncontrolled 4.36 0.24 * 140.97 * 0.06
School Controls 6.32 0.43 * 59.29 * 0.19
SES Controls 2.01 0.42 * 85.70 * 0.36
-22.87 6.75 * 67.45 * 0.39
RURAL Private Subsidized and Public Schools   N=569
Uncontrolled -0.35 1.37 0.07 0.00
School Controls 1.02 1.52 3.57 * 0.04
SES Controls -0.17 1.44 7.91 * 0.15
-38.02 29.27 6.20 * 0.16
Note: First three rows of each panel have no interaction terms and the PS coef is the vertical distance
between parallel production functions (i.e. constant additive treatment effect). The fourth row is the PS 
coeficient for the model with interactions of PS with Xi and corresponds to the vertical distance 
between non-parallel production function at the y axis.
* = statistically significant with 95% confidence.





Difference between Private Subsidized and Public School Production Functions39
Table 5. Probit Results
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
INTERCEPT -2,16 0,15 *
RURAL -0,99 0,05 *
HHINC 0,00 0,00 *
MEDUC 0,08 0,01 *
FEDUC 0,07 0,01 *
NUMPER -0,08 0,01 *
POVERTY 0,25 0,03 *
SEXO -0,08 0,03 **
EDUC 0,04 0,02 **





* : statistically significant at 99% confidence
** : statistically significant at 95% confidence
Table 4
OLS Regresion Results
Variable Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
intercept 66.58 0.22 * 59.12 2.19 * 47.23 4.60 * 58.59 5.33 * 31.83 5.93 * 59.03 6.21 *
private subsidized dummy 4.07 0.45 * 4.77 0.52 * -0.14 0.50 -29.10 9.22 *
rural dummy 0.37 0.48 2.49 0.50 * 1.50 0.53 * 5.58 1.03 * 1.44 0.61 *
class size -0.13 0.02 * -0.15 0.02 * -0.20 0.02 * 0.06 0.03 * -0.20 0.02 *
male school 6.98 2.03 * 2.80 1.81 1.68 1.79 4.65 1.75 * -0.55 2.96
female school 5.99 1.22 * 3.67 1.09 * 2.41 1.08 * 1.55 0.99 2.51 2.01
number of teachers 0.24 0.02 * 0.07 0.02 * 0.07 0.02 * 0.06 0.03 * 0.07 0.03 *
N. of years of teaching experience 0.07 0.03 ** 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
Hours worked -0.05 0.03 * -0.02 0.03 * -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.03
% of teachers with education degree 9.33 1.99 * 9.82 1.77 * 8.18 1.77 * 9.16 1.99 * 7.25 2.58 *
% of male teachers -3.90 1.16 * 0.31 1.05 -0.20 1.04 -7.84 1.63 * 1.79 1.32
Vulnerability Index -0.11 0.01 * -0.11 0.01 * -0.13 0.02 * -0.11 0.01 *
Number of people in a the household -0.92 0.22 * -0.95 0.21 * -1.09 0.31 * -0.91 0.27 *
Poverty line index 4.76 0.61 * 5.17 0.68 * 2.38 0.94 * 5.21 0.77 *
Log of Household Total Income 0.41 0.40 -0.05 0.47 1.40 0.50 * -0.09 0.54
maternal education 1.20 0.14 * 1.09 0.16 * 1.24 0.20 * 1.12 0.18 *
paternal education -0.29 0.13 * -0.61 0.15 * 0.32 0.17 ** -0.62 0.17 *
private subsidized dummy interactions
class size 0.26 0.04 *
rural dummy 3.93 1.52 *
Vulnerability Index -0.03 0.03
Poverty line index -2.12 1.44
Log of Household Total Income 1.29 0.82
maternal education 0.21 0.31
paternal education 0.89 0.28 *
N 2789 2789 2789 2789 982 1806
R2 0.03 0.12 0.3 0.32 0.55 0.21
Note: * is significant at 95% confidence level. ** is significant at 90% confidence.
Weights=Number of students from Casen/Total enrollment
Sample: Public and Private subsidized Schools Sample: Private Sample : Public
MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV Subsidized Schools Schools40
Table 6
F-stat R2 adj
coef st error coef st error
Absolute Advantage Model: Equal Covariance Between Selection and Test Scores
Constant Treatment Model -20.27 6.25 * -20.27 6.25 * 64.11 * 0.29
Heterogenous Treatment Model -19.16 6.18 * -19.16 6.18 * 50.81 * 0.31
Comparative Advantage Model: Unequal Covariance Between Selection and Test Scores
Constant Treatment Model -33.10 7.66 * -16.47 6.39 * 61.19 * 0.29
Heterogenous Treatment Model 6.73 11.89 -28.22 7.12 * 48.13 * 0.31
Private Schools Only 1.76 8.57 65.19 * 0.52
Public Schools Only -28.60 8.10 * 30.14 * 0.21
Note: Constant treatment effect models are those with no interaction terms of PS with X. The heterogenous
treatment model includes interactions of PS with the deviation of the X's from its
mean. * = statistically significant with 95% confidence.
Weights= Number of students from CASEN/total enrollment
lpu
Selection Correction Coefficients in the Heckman Selection Models
lps41
References
Aedo, C. (1996). Calidad de la educacion y elementos de mercado, Educacion en Chile: Un
desafio de calidad (pp. 57-130). Santiago: ENERSIS.
Aedo, C. (1998). Differences in schools and student performance in Chile. In W. D.
Savedoff (Ed.), Organization matters: Agency problems in health and education in
Latin America (pp. 39-73). Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Aedo, C., &  Larranaga, O. (1994).  Sistemas  de  entrega de  los  servicios  sociales: La
experiencia chilena. In C. Aedo & O. Larranaga (Eds.), Sistema de entrega de los
servicios  sociales:  Una agenda  para la  reforma (pp. 33-74). Washington, DC:
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
Alexander, K. and A. Pallas (1983) Private schools and public policy: response to Kilgore,
Sociology Of Education, 57, 56-58.
Arum, R. (1996). Do private schools force public schools to compete?  American
Sociological Review.
Blinder, K. (1993). Comparing student achievement in public and catholic schools:
different schools or different students? Paper presented at the APPAM conference.
Bravo, D., Contreras, D. and Sanhueza, C. (1999). Educational achievement, inequalities
and private/public gap: Chile 1982-1997. Department of Economics, Universidad de
Chile.
Bryk, A., and V. Lee (1993). Science of policy argument? A rejoinder to Chubb and Moe.
In  Rasell, E. and R.  Rothstein ( Eds) School choice: Examining the evidence,
Washington D.C. Economic Policy Institute.
Carlson, B. (2000). Achieving educational quality: What schools teach us. Learning from
Chile's P900 primary schools. Serie Dearrollo Productivo, 64, CEPAL.
Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). Politics, markets, and America’s schools. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution.
Coleman, J., Hoffer, T., and S. Kilmore (1981). Public and private schools: Report to the
national center for education statistics.  Chicago, IL, National Opinion Research
Center.
Coleman, J., Hoffer, T., and S. Kilmore (1982a). Cognitive outcomes in public and private
schools, Sociology Of Education, 55, 65-76.
Coleman, J., Hoffer, T., and S. Kilmore (1982b). High school achievement: Public, catholic
and private schools compared. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc.
Coleman, J. S., &  Hoffer, T. (1987).  Public and private high schools: The impact of
communities. New York: Basic Books.
Cox, C. (1997). La reforma de la educacion chilena: Contexto, contenidos, implementacion,
Programa de Promocion de la Reforma Educativa en America Latina (PREAL).
Cox, D. & Jimenez, E. (1991). The relative effectiveness of private and public schools:
Evidence from two developing countries, Journal of Development Economics, 34,
pp. 99-121.
Dee, T. S. (1998). Competition and the quality of public schools. Economics of Education
Review, 17(4), 419-427.
Epple, D., &  Romano, R. E. (1998).  Competition between private and public schools,
vouchers, and peer-group effects. American Economic Review, 88(1), 33-62.
Duncombe, W., Ruggiero, J., & Yinger, J. (1996). Alternative approaches to measuring the
cost of education. In H. F. Ladd (Ed.), Holding schools accountable: Performance-42
based reform in education (pp. 327-356). Washington, DC: The  Brookings
Institution.
Espinola, V. (1993). The educational reform of the military regime in Chile: The system’s
response to competition, choice, and market relations. Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wales, United Kingdom.
Evans, W. and R. Schwab (1995). Finishing high school and starting college: Do catholic
schools make a difference? Quarterly Journal Of Economics 105, 941-974.
Figlio, D. and J. Stone (1997). School choice and student performance. Are private schools
really better?  Discussion paper No. 1141-97, Institute for research on poverty,
University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Friedman, M. (1955). The role of government in education. In R. A. Solo (Ed.), Economics
and the public interest (pp. 123-144). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gauri, V. (1998). School choice in Chile: Two decades of educational reform. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Goldberger A. and G. Cain (1982). The casual analysis of cognitive outcomes in the
Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore report. Sociology Of Education 55, 103-122.
Goldhaber D. (1996). Public and private high schools, is school choice an answer to the
productivity problem? Economics Of Education Review 15, 93-109.
Greene, J. P., Peterson, P. E., & Du, J. (1998). School choice in Milwaukee: A randomized
experiment. In P. E. Peterson & B. C. Hassel (Eds.), Learning from school choice
(pp. 335-356). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Greene, W. H. (1997). Econometric analysis. (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Haertel, E. H. (1987). Comparing public and private schools using longitudinal data from
the HSB study. In E. H. Haertel, T. James, & H. M. Levin (Eds.), Comparing public
and private schools (Vol. 2, pp. 9-32). New York: The Falmer Press.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47(1),
153-161.
Hoxby, C. M. (1994). Do private schools provide competition for public schools?, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4978.
Krashinsky, M. (1986). Why education vouchers may be bad economics. Teachers college
record, 88, 163-168.
Jimenez, E., Lockheed, M., Luna, E., and V. Paqueo (1991a). School effects and costs for
private and public schools in the Dominican Republic. International journal of
education research 15, 393-410.
 Jimenez, E., Lockheed, M., Luna, E., and V. Paqueo (1991b). The relative efficiency of
private and public schools in developing countries. World Bank Research Observer
6, 205-218.
Jimenez, E., & Lockheed, M. E. (1995). Public and private secondary education in
developing countries: A comparative study,  World Bank Discussion Paper 309,
World Bank.
Jofre, G. (1988). El  sistema de  subvenciones en  educación: La  experiencia  chilena.
Estudios Publicos.
Larranaga, O. (1995).  Descentralizacion de la  educacion en Chile:  Una  evaluacion
económica. Estudios Publicos(60), 243-286.43
Lee, L.-F. (1983). Generalized econometric models with selectivity. Econometrica, 51(2),
507-512.
Levin, H. (1980). Education vouchers and social policy, in: Guthrie (ed) School finance
policies and practices, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing.
Levin, H. M. (1998). Educational vouchers: Effectiveness, choice, and costs. Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 17(3), 373-391.
Madaus, G., Kellaghan, T., Rakow, A., and D. King (1979). The sensitivity of measures of
school effectiveness. Harvard education review 49(2), 207-230.
Mizala, A., Romaguera, P. and Farren, D. (1997). Frontera de producción educacional y
eficiencia de la educación en Chile. Persona y sociedad, vol XI, No. 2, ILADES.
Mizala A. and P.  Romaguera (1998). “ Desempeno  escolar y  elección de  colegios: la
experiencia chilena”. Center of Applied Economics, Universidad de Chile.
Mizala A. and P.  Romaguera (2000) School performance and choice: The  chilean
experience, The journal of human resources, vol. XXXV, No. 2.
Murnane, R. J., Newstead, S., & Olsen, R. J. (1985). Comparing public and private schools:
The puzzling role of selection bias, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 3,
pp. 23-35.
Neal, D. (1998). What have we learned about the benefits of private schooling? Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review, 4(1), 79-86.
Newmark, C. M. (1995). Another look at whether private schools influence public school
quality. Public Choice, 82(3), 365-373.
Noell, J. (1982). Public and catholic schools: a real analysis of “public and private schools”.
Sociology of education 5, 123-132.
Parry, T. R. (1996). Will pursuit of higher quality sacrifice equal opportunity in education?
An analysis of the education voucher system in Santiago. Social Science Quarterly,
77(4), 821-841.
Parry, T. R. (1997a). Achieving balance in decentralization: A case study of education
decentralization in Chile. World Development, 25(2), 211-225.
Parry, T. R. (1997b). Decentralization and privatization: Education policy in Chile. Journal
of Public Policy, 17(1), 107-133.
Parry, T. R. (1997c). Theory meets reality in the education voucher debate: Some evidence
from Chile. Education Economics, 5(3), 307-331.
Riddell, A. R. (1993). The evidence on public/private educational trade-offs in developing
countries. International Journal of Educational Development, 13(4), 373-386.
Rodriguez, J. (1988). School achievement and decentralization policy: the chilean case.
Revista de análisis económico, vol. 3, No. 1, 75-88.
Rouse, C. E. (1998a). Private school vouchers and student achievement: An evaluation of
the Milwaukee parental choice program. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2),
553-602.
Rouse, C. E. (1998b). Schools and student achievement: More evidence from the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic
Policy Review, 4(1), 61-76.
Rubin, D.  (1977). Assignment to a treatment group on the basis of a coveriate. Journal of
educational Statistics, 2, 1-26.
Sander, W. (1996). Catholic grade schools and academic achievement. Journal of human
resources 31, 540-548.44
Spicer, M. and E. Hill (1990). Evaluating parental choice in public education: policy
beyond the monopoly model, American journal of education, February, 97-113.
Willms, J. (1983) Do private schools produce higher levels of academic achievement? New
evidence for the tuition tax credit debate, in James, T. and H. Levin (Eds) Public
dollars for private schools: the case of tuition tax credits, Philadelphia, PA, Temple
University Press.
Winkler, D. R., & Rounds, T. (1996).  Municipal and private sector response to
decentralization and school choice. Economics of Education Review, 15(4), 365-
376.
Witte, J. F. (1992). Private school versus public school achievement: Are there findings
that should affect the educational choice debate? Economics of Education Review,
11(4), 371-394.
Witte, J. F. (1996). School choice and student performance. In H. F. Ladd (Ed.), Holding
schools accountable: Performance-based reform in education (pp. 149-176).
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Witte, J. F. (1998). The Milwaukee  voucher experiment.  Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis, 20(4), 229-251.Documentos de Trabajo
Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers
Central Bank of Chile
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES PAST ISSUES
 La  serie de  Documentos de Trabajo en  versión PDF  puede  obtenerse gratis en la  dirección  electrónica:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm.  Existe la  posibilidad de  solicitar  una  copia
impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se
pueden hacer por fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@condor.bcentral.cl
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Printed versions can be ordered individually for
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231
or e-mail: bcch@condor.bcentral.cl
DTBC-146
The Golden Period for Growth in Chile:
Explanations and Forecasts
Francisco Gallego y Norman Loayza
Febrero 2002
DTBC-145
Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth
Norman Loayza y Romain Ranciere
Febrero 2002
DTBC-144
Concentration of Population in Capital Cities:








Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment
Thorvaldur Gylfason y Gylfi Zoega
Febrero 2002
DTBC-141
Open Questions about the Link between Natural Resources and
Economic Growth: Sachs and Warner Revisited




John T. Cuddington, Rodney Ludema y Shamila A Jayasuriya
Febrero 2002DTBC-139
The Relative Richness of the Poor? Natural Resources, Human
Capital and Economic Growth
Claudio Bravo-Ortega y José De Gregorio
Febrero 2002
DTBC-138
Depreciación del Capital Natural, Ingreso y Crecimiento Sostenible:
Lecciones de la Experiencia Chilena
Eugenio Figueroa B. y Enrique Calfucura T.
Febrero 2002
DTBC-137
The Distribution of Stochastic Shrinkage Parameters in Ridge
Regression
Hernán Rubio y Luis Firinguetti
Febrero 2002
DTBC-136








On the Determinants of the Chilean Economic Growth
Rómulo A. Chumacero y J. Rodrigo Fuentes
Enero 2002
DTBC-133
Cálculo del Stock de Capital para Chile, 1985-2000
Ximena Aguilar M. y María Paz Collinao
Diciembre 2001
DTBC-132
Políticas de Estabilización en Chile durante los Noventa
Carlos José García T.
Diciembre 2001
DTBC-131
Ten Years of Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges
Norman Loayza y Raimundo Soto
Noviembre 2001
DTBC-130
Trends and Cycles in Real-Time
Rómulo A. Chumacero y Francisco A. Gallego
Noviembre 2001